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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS and 
ADMINISTRATORS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE CP-764 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Employer. 
In the Matter of 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, 
CASE NO. E-2258 
Upon the Application for Designation of 
Persons as Managerial or Confidential. 
LAW OFFICES OF RICHARD D. FURLONG (MICHAEL REILLY of 
counsel), for BUFFALO COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORS and 
ADMINISTRATORS 
MICHAEL RISMAN, CORPORATION COUNSEL (JOY C. TROTTER of 
counsel), for BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Buffalo Council of Supervisors 
and Administrators (BCSA) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
designating the title of Assistant Superintendent for School Leadership and Evaluation 
as managerial pursuant to an application filed by the Board of Education of the City 
Board - CP-764 & E-2258 -2 
School District of the City of Buffalo (District). Having designated the incumbents in the 
title - Mark Frazier, Carol Needham and Christopher Quinn- the ALJ dismissed the unit 
clarification petition filed by BCSA which sought to include the newly created title in its 
bargaining unit.1 The ALJ determined that incumbents in this Assistant Superintendent 
title were engaged in policy formulation, contract and personnel administration and 
could reasonably be expected to participate, on behalf of the District, in collective 
negotiations with BCSA. 
EXCEPTIONS 
BCSA argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that the title of Assistant 
Superintendent for School Leadership and Evaluation is managerial within the meaning 
of §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). As pointed out by the 
District in its response to BCSA's exceptions, BCSA does not so much except to the 
ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law, as to the ALJ's ultimate decision.2 The 
District supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
1The BCSA unit includes: All Principals, Assistant Principals, Directors, 
Supervisors, Project Administrators, Assistant Superintendents, Elementary 
Supervising Principals, Secondary Supervising Principals and any other persons 
serving in supervisory capacities sometimes called "Administrators" employed by the 
D io+riot IvJLI 1WL. 
2By letter dated June 3, 2002, BCSA filed a reply to the District's response. 
PERB's Rules of Procedure, §213.3, provide that no such additional pleadings will be 
accepted or considered by the Board unless requested or authorized by the Board. 
BCSA's reply has, therefore, not been considered by us. 
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FACTS 
The facts are set forth in detail in the ALJ's decision and we adopt the factual 
findings of the ALJ, as they are fully supported by the record testimony and exhibits. 
The facts are repeated here only as relevant to our decision. 
The District created the title of Assistant Superintendent for School Leadership 
and Evaluation (Assistant Superintendent) in 2001 as part of a management 
reorganization plan.3 The three incumbents in the position are expected to, and actually 
do, spend the majority of their time in their assigned schools and not in the District's 
central offices. Their main job responsibility is to improve student academic 
performance by monitoring and facilitating the implementation of each school's 
individualized Comprehensive School Education Plan (CSEP). 
The Assistant Superintendents report directly to the Associate Superintendent of 
Leadership and Operations (Associate Superintendent) but also have direct access to 
the Superintendent, primarily at the Superintendent's weekly cabinet meetings.4 At 
these meetings, all aspects of District policies are discussed, including implementation 
of new policy and proposed changes in policy. In the past year, the Assistant 
3The reorganization plan was based upon a study conducted for the District by 
the Council of Great City Schools, which recommended that the Superintendent of 
Schools (Superintendent) appoint additional members of her management team to 
such positions. Joint Exhibit 8. 
4The cabinet also includes the Superintendent's Executive Assistant, Director of 
Labor Relations, Director of Public Relations, Chief Academic Officer, Chief Operations 
Officer, Associate Superintendents, Executive Director of Human Resources, and 
Executive Director of Information and Technology, none of whom are represented 
employees. 
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Superintendents have made recommendations at these meetings as to hiring, lay-offs 
and vacancies. 
The Assistant Superintendents also have a leadership and liaison role in the 
implementation of the District's plan to provide parents with school selection options. 
Frazier, for example, is preparing recommendations as to the configuration of the 
schools and all three Assistant Superintendents will have a lead role in the public 
hearings to be conducted on the District's plan. 
At the Associate Superintendent's direction, the Assistant Superintendents meet 
with the parties to all grievances filed by the Buffalo Teachers Federation (BTF) which 
are specific to the buildings to which they are assigned, either before they are filed (in , 
an attempt to resolve the potential grievance), or after the first step of the grievance 
procedure. The Assistant Superintendents have the authority to settle grievances at 
their level before they proceed to the Associate Superintendent. 
The Assistant Superintendents are intended to participate in the preparation of 
proposals for negotiations with the BCSA and to be members of the District's 
negotiating team with that unit. 
DISCUSSION 
We have previously held that participation in meetings of the chief executive 
officer's cabinet is sufficient to support a managerial designation. In City of Jamestown,5 
we found that because the assistant fire chiefs regularly participated in the Fire Chief's 
cabinet meetings, where departmental objectives and policies were formulated and 
.; 525PERB 1J3015 (1992). 
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implemented, that was itself sufficient to warrant their designation as managerial. As we 
noted in City of Lackawanna,6 in designating the comptroller and the treasurer as 
managerial, they 
participate in these cabinet discussions by offering 
information, opinions or advice. Although their participation 
is limited to their fields of expertise, their participation is 
nevertheless within that of policy-making managers. The 
definition of a policymaker is, and must be, sufficiently broad 
to include those relatively few individuals who directly assist 
the ultimate decisionmakers in reaching the decisions 
necessary to the conduct of the business of government. 
The record establishes that the Assistant Superintendents offer advice, information and 
opinions during discussions with the Superintendent at the cabinet meetings. The ALJ 
correctly relied upon the cited decisions in concluding that the Assistant 
Superintendents of Leadership and Evaluation met the statutory criteria for designation 
as managerial due to their role in policy formulation. 
Our decision could end here; however, certain arguments raised by BCSA 
should be addressed. We also find that the record supports the ALJ's determination 
that the Assistant Superintendents are managerial based upon alternative criteria. The 
ALJ found that the Assistant Superintendents could "reasonably be expected" to 
participate in labor relations by virtue of the District's stated intention to utilize the 
Assistant Superintendents in the formulation of negotiations proposals and as members 
of the District's negotiating team in contract negotiations with the BCSA. 
A managerial designation based on labor relations responsibilities, personnel or 
contract administration can be based on duties not yet performed, if those duties are 
28 PERB 1J3043, at 3100 (1995). 
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reasonably required.7 The actual or anticipated role in these activities, however, must 
be reasonable, direct, major, not of a routine or clerical nature, and must involve the 
exercise of independent judgment. Certainly, the drafting of negotiations proposals and 
the participation on the District's negotiating team are duties that can "reasonably be 
required" of an Assistant Superintendent.8 The title, the duties already performed by 
the Assistant Superintendents, and the District's stated intent are sufficient to support 
the ALJ's decision on this issue. That the BCSA has some doubt that the District will in 
fact utilize the Assistant Superintendents in this manner is not sufficient to defeat their 
designation. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny BCSA's exceptions and affirm the decision of 
the ALJ granting the District's application. 
Because of our decision on the managerial application filed by the District, we. 
need not reach any separate issues raised by BCSA's unit clarification petition and we 
affirm the ALJ's decision dismissing the unit clarification petition. 
7Act, §201.7(a), which states, in relevant part, that: 
Employees may be designated as managerial only if they 
are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) who may 
reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to 
assist directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective 
negotiations or to have a major role in the administration of 
agreements or in personnel administration provided that 
such role is not of a routine or clerical nature and requires 
the exercise of independent judgment. Employees may be 
designated as confidential only if they are persons who 
assist and act in a confidential capacity to managerial 
employees described in clause (ii). 
8See City of Jamestown, 19 PERB P019 (1986), confd, 126 AD2d 826, 
20 PERB 1J7004 (3d Dep't 1987). 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the following employees of the District 
be, and they hereby are, designated managerial: Mark Frazier, Carol Needham and 
Christopher Quinn. 
WE FURTHER ORDER that the unit clarification petition in CP-764 is dismissed 
in its entirety. 
DATED: June 12,2002 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
T y John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS 
(EDMUND EGAN), 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22037 
STATE OF NEW YORK (STATE UNIVERSITY OF 
NEW YORK - SUNY AT BUFFALO), 
Respondent. 
EDWARD J. GIBLIN, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (AMY M. PETRAGNANI 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by United University Professions 
(UUP) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its improper 
practice charge alleging that the State of New York (State University of New York -
SUNY at Buffalo) (SUNY) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it prevented Dr. Edmund Egan from engaging in clinical 
practice in retaliation for his participation in protected activities. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
UUP has excepted to the ALJ's decision of March 1, 2002, based upon her 
findings of fact and conclusions of law in dismissing the charge. 
SUNY has filed cross-exceptions also based upon the ALJ's findings of fact and 
conclusions ofJaw_and, moreL particularly, asjheyLrelateto the jurisdiction of the Public 
Employment Relations Board (Board) over the improper practice charge. 
FACTS 
We will confine our analysis to the salient facts relevant to our resolution of the 
exceptions. 
UUP filed its charge with PERB on October 17, 2000. It alleged that the 
respondent, SUNY, violated §209-a.1(a) of the Act, from June 30, 2000 to present, by 
preventing Egan, a faculty member of the SUNY at Buffalo School of Medicine (School 
of Medicine), from engaging in clinical practice at Children's Hospital of Buffalo resulting 
in the loss of clinical practice income. UUP further alleged that SUNY, through its 
agents, including Dr. Frederick C. Morin III, unlawfully interfered with, restrained and 
coerced Egan in the exercise of his rights guaranteed in §202 of the Act for the purpose 
of depriving him of such rights. Furthermore, UUP alleges, SUNY discriminated 
against Egan for the purpose of discouraging his membership in, or participation in, the 
activities of UUP. 
SUNY's amended answer not only denied the material allegations of the charge 
and included certain defenses which raised not only the question of PERB's jurisdiction 
over the charge, but also claimed that "any alleged actions were taken by a faculty 
i 
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practice group, which both the State and UUP have acknowledged is a legal entity 
separate and apart from the State and the SUNY and Buffalo Medical School 
Hearings were conducted on May 7 and 8, July 17, and September 27, 2001. 
The record revealed that Egan was employed at the School of Medicine in the 
department ofipediatrics. As^with otherfaculty'at theSchool ofMedicine, Egan was 
afforded the opportunity to receive clinical practice income through his department's 
pediatric faculty practice group, University Pediatrics Associates, Inc. (UPA). 
SUNY, through its Board of Trustees (Trustees), has promulgated certain 
policies which constitute rules of the Trustees for the government of the SUNY.1 The 
Trustees developed a plan under which clinical practice income was to be managed, 
which is set forth in Article XVI of the policies. As a faculty member in the School of 
Medicine, Egan was obliged to participate in the plan under the terms of Article XVI. 
Article XIX of the policies states that the provisions of the policies shall be 
applicable to employees in negotiating units and "in the event that the provisions of the 
[respective collective bargaining] agreement are different from the provisions of said 
policies, the provisions of the agreement shall be controlling." Article 29 of the 
agreement between the State and UUP provides that "[T]he provisions of Article XVI of 
the Policies shall be subject to review in the grievance procedure."2 
Annexed to the Amended Answer is a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), dated 
February 1, 2001 and executed by representatives of UUP and the State which defined 
1Joint Exhibit 4, Article 1, §1 (2000). 
2Joint Exhibit 1. 
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the relationship between UUP, the State and SUNY under the Plan. It expressly states 
that 
[s]ince the early 1970's, . . . UUP has negotiated several collective 
bargaining agreements with the State of New York (State) which 
establish plans for the management of clinical practice income . . . . 
In discussions with the State over the years, UUP has emphasized 
its need to continue to provide for clinical practice and to_ensure 
that monies earned as part of clinical practice are kept separate 
and distinct from any money appropriated by the State for SUNY. 
The physicians in the Medical School at the University at Buffalo 
have established faculty practice groups. These practice groups 
may serve to limit the physician's liability, provide tax advantages 
and facilitate business dealings of the physicians. A faculty 
practice group is a separate legal entity whether organized as a 
partnership, corporation, or other legal structure . . . . As separate 
legal entities, the faculty group practices are not subject to the 
control of the State or SUNY except pursuant to Article 29 of the 
collective bargaining agreement. Article XVI of the Policies, 
Appendix 9 to the Agreement, Appendix A-38, entitled "The 1999 
Memorandum of Understanding", dated March 29,1996 . . . . 
Monies generated by clinical practice are funds wholly owned by 
the physicians organized into separate group practice plans, 
whether organized along departmental, multi-departmental, or 
institution-wide lines . . . . In effect, clinical practice plan members 
are employees of both SUNY and the individual groups. Both 
provide W-2 statements at the end of the taxable yea r . . . . Faculty 
Practice Groups may also limit a physician's malpractice, business 
and individual tax liabilities. The Faculty Practice Groups may also 
act as business agents, provide significant advantages to the 
members of the plan, because they have the ability to sell the 
services of the physicians in the plan to outside entities. As 
separate and distinct legal entities, group practice entities are not 
subject to State competitive bidding rules and regulations, but are 
expected to use sound business practices. The group practice 
entities are not parties to the UUP collective bargaining agreement 
with the State, but their actions must be consistent with [the Plan], 
th<=> Cnllfir.tivfi Barnaininn Ann=>pmp»nt and anv annrnnriatf i 
Memoranda . . . . The State and SUNY are neither responsible nor 
liable, financially or otherwise, for any action(s) taken by a group 
practice entity that are inconsistent with these documents. As with 
any private employer, the group practice entities are subject to civil 
^ Board - U-22037 -5 
suit by individuals they employ. To the degree necessary, the 
conclusion of any administrative procedures, such as the UUP 
grievance procedure, may form a necessary first step in allowing 
individual physicians to initiate lawsuits against their clinical 
practice groups for alleged violations of their individual rights. 
On May 7, 2001, at the close of the UUP's direct case, counsel for SUNY made 
amotion toL dismiss on the.grounds that PERB lacked jurisdiction overithe issue raised 
by the improper practice charge. The ALJ reserved decision and the hearings 
continued. The ALJ issued her decision on March 1, 2002, finding that PERB had 
jurisdiction but dismissing the charge on its merits. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we reverse the ALJ's decision on jurisdiction. 
DISCUSSION 
) 
UUP, in its exceptions to the ALJ decision dismissing its improper practice 
charge, argues that it met its burden by demonstrating that but for Egan's protected 
activity (filing grievances), he would not have lost his clinical practice income. SUNY 
argues in its exceptions, inter alia, that the ALJ erred in determining that PERB has 
jurisdiction over issues raised by the aforesaid charge. We agree. 
Egan, as a faculty member of the School of Medicine at SUNY Buffalo, was 
allowed to earn outside income separate and apart from his salary as a SUNY 
professor. The source of this outside income was derived from the practice of his 
medical speciality. At the heart of this dispute is the limitation placed upon Egan's 
outside income. Egan took certain actions, including the filing of grievances, which led 
UPA to terminate his association with it. The basis of UUP's argument that such action 
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constitutes an improper practice charge within our jurisdiction is the dual role played by 
Morin, who is both President of UPA and Chairman of the Medical School's Department 
of Pediatrics, and the involvement of SUNY in UPA's operations. 
A review of the history of the practice plans illustrates that: 
It isthepracticei_o.fimost medical schools in this_country to allow 
full-time medical faculty members to also maintain a private 
practice. In order to regulate the amount of time devoted to such 
practice (by limiting the total amount of professional income a 
faculty member may earn), it is generally the procedure to require 
faculty members to treat their private patients through a practice 
plan.3 
Prior to 1982, Article 8-AA of the Education Law authorized the trustees of SUNY 
to create "clinical practice income management corporations" in accordance with its 
statutory provisions to collect, manage and disburse clinical practice income at each of 
) 
the State's University's medical and dental schools.4 However, Article 8-AA was 
2Frontier Insurance Co. v. State of New York, 146 Misc.2d 237, at 243 (1989), 
aff'd 172 AD2d 13 (3d Dep't 1991). "While practice plans . . . are in effect in medical 
schools throughout the United States and in all four medical schools in the SUNY 
system they play an additional important role at SUNY Buffalo, the only State University 
medical school that does not have its own State-owned hospital. To obtain a hospital 
setting for its clinical teaching activities, the school has entered into affiliation contracts 
with local area hospitals including Children's Hospital and . . . SUNY expects its faculty 
members to provide, through their practice plan, the patients on whom the students are 
trained." (at 244) See also Kountz v. State University of New York, 109 Misc.2d 319, at 
324 (1981), aff'd 87 AD2d 605 (2d Dep't 1982), which found that". . . 85% of the 
medical schools in the United States have clinical practice plans. This statement was 
c i i n n n r f o r l 1r\\ t o r n n n r f r M - Q n o r o ' * ! V\\i t h o A C O ^ / ^ I Q + ! / * * » - » r ^ A m n r i / ^ Q n I V ^ o ' " ! ' ' " ^ I / ^ A l l o n o c o u | j p u i L C \ J \jy a l O p u u [ J i C f - f d i C u uy u I O r v o o u o i d u u n u i r\\ I IC?I i i /Oi i i v i o u i u a i \_ /v-*n^y^o 
surveying these plans". See also Bourke v. Albany Medical Center, 176 AD2d 1028 (3d 
Dep't 1991). 
AFrontier Insurance Co. v. State of New York, supra note 3. 
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repealed by the laws of 1982.5 The provisions of Article 8-AA were replaced in part by 
the provisions of Part 340 of the Policies of the Board of Trustees of the State 
University of New York (8 NYCRR Part 340). Article XVI of the Policies of the Trustees 
duplicates 8 NYCRR part 340. 
The document that implements theTrustees'plan isthe formal agreement 
executed on or about September 13, 2000, between SUNY at Buffalo, School of 
Medicine; SUNY; UB Associates, Inc., the governing board of the Practice Plan; and the 
various clinical practice corporations found in the record as UUP's Exhibit #2. This 
service agreement establishes an accounting procedure for compensation and 
reimbursement. Section 10.6 of the agreement expressly provides that 
[N]either this Agreement, which represents terms and conditions 
applicable to the operation and administration of the Practice Plan, 
nor any provision hereof, shall be deemed to create a joint venture, 
partnership, unincorporated association or any other entity, or 
create an employment relationship, among or between any of the 
parties hereto for any purpose whatsoever. 
The State's agreement with UUP is intended to keep the plan's funds separate 
and distinct from State monies and to insulate the State from liability for malpractice 
committed by any of the practice groups. 
But SUNY does exercise some control over limited areas of the operations of the 
plans, as members of the boards of directors of the plans are also employees of the 
School of Medicine, and doctors participate in the plans only by virtue of their 
employment by the School of Medicine. These few elements of State involvement in 
J 
5L 1982, c. 924, §3. 
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the operation of the plans do not, however, transform what is substantially a private 
employer - UPA - into a public employer.6 UPA is a private corporation that exercises 
substantial control over the terms and conditions of employment of the doctors who 
participate in the plan and is, therefore, the employer of these employees. While there 
is somesupervision byiSUNYLoverJUPA, that aloneLisjnsufficientto establish that UPA 
is a public employer, especially where, as here, UPA serves no governmental or 
proprietary function, there is no receipt of public money by UPA and the doctors, as 
participants in UPA, have no civil service status.7 
The plan was developed in consultation and negotiation with UUP.8 Under the 
terms of Article 29 of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, the terms of Article 
XVI of the Policies were subject to the provisions of the grievance procedure. However, 
the intent of Article 29 as it applied to Article XVI of the Policies is found in the February 
2001 MOA. The parties understood the MOA to mean, inter alia, that "[T]o the degree 
necessary, the conclusion of any administrative procedures, such as the UUP 
grievance procedure, may form a necessary first step in allowing individual physicians 
to initiate lawsuits against their clinical practice groups for alleged violations of their 
See Ad Hoc Committee of Regents College Degrees and Examinations 
Professional Employees, 24 PERB 1J6501 (1991), for a discussion of the effect of the 
appointment of a public officer by a governmental entity and political accountability as 
factors in determining "public employer" status. Evidence of this kind of political 
accountability to a government officer or entity is absent from this record. 
7See State of New York (Insurance Dep't Liquidation Bureau) v. PERB, 146 
AD2d 961, 22 PERB 1J7008 (3d Dep't 1989). 
'Transcript, p. 68. 
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individual rights." In addition to the improper practice charge filed in this matter, Egan 
also has pending lawsuits against UUP and UPA in State Supreme Court and against 
the State of New York in the Court of Claims.9 
The evidence in the record indicates that UPA is a private professional -
corporation with its own board of directorsand employees.10 Egan was_employe_d by 
the corporation and the instant charge relates to actions taken by UPA with respect to 
his private employment, not SUNY employment, and not with respect to his pedagogical 
duties, which form the basis of Egan's public employment. No university official ordered 
his employment with the corporation terminated in June, 2000.11 The UPA Board of 
Directors voted against renewing Egan's contract. He still retained his employment as a 
faculty member at the School of Medicine. 
Upon review of all of the evidence in the record, we find, therefore, that UUP has 
failed to prove that PERB has jurisdiction over this dispute. Only employment which is 
"unequivocally or substantially public" is subject to the Act's jurisdiction.12 UPA is a 
private employer over which we do not have jurisdiction. With respect to the State's 
involvement in the operation of UPA, we find that, at best, SUNY and UPA might 
constitute a joint employer. However, even if that is the case, we do not have 
9Transcript, p. 82. 
10Transcript, p. 147. 
"Transcript, pp. 148, 186 and 241. 
12/v.Y. Public Library v. PERB, 45 AD2d 271, 7 PERB fl7013 (1s t Dep't 1974), 
aff'd 37 N.Y.2d 752, 8 PERB TJ7013 (1975). 
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jurisdiction over this matter because one of the components of this "joint employer" -
UPA - is a private employer.13 
Based upon the foregoing, we reverse the ALJ's decision on jurisdiction and 
dismiss the charge upon jurisdictional grounds only. As such, we need not reach the 
exceptions raised bythe parties concerning the merits of the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and hereby is, dismissed in 
its entirety. 
DATED: June 12,2002 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
n T. Mitchell, Member 
^Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 13 PERB 1J3003, at 3004 (1980). "The 
jurisdiction of this Board extends to a 'joint public employer of public employees' 
(footnote omitted), but not to employees of a joint employer, one part of which is a 
private employer." 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY 
AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1671, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-22390 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF LONG BEACH, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LONG BEACH PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES 
GROUP C ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
MARGARET McCANN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
INGERMAN SMITH, LLP (CHRISTOPHER VENATOR of counsel), for 
Respondent 
WILLIAM FRIEDMAN, ESQ., for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Long Beach Public School 
Employees Group C Association (Association) to a decision of an Administrative Law 
Judge (ALJ) finding that the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of 
Long Beach (District) violated §§209-a.1(a) and (e) of the Public Employees' Fair 
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Employment Act (Act) when it refused to forward to the American Federation of State, 
County and Municipal Employees, Local 1671 (Local 1671) union dues deducted from 
employees in the unit represented by Local 1671. The ALJ found that the claims made 
to the District by the Association that it was entitled to the dues from unit employees did 
not excuse the District from its obligation, both under the Act and underJheexpired 
collective bargaining agreement, to remit the dues to Local 1671 while it was the 
certified bargaining agent. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Association excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that this Board does not 
have jurisdiction over a decision by public employees to disaffiliate from one employee 
organization and affiliate with another and that, in any event, Local 1671 abandoned the 
bargaining unit and thus forfeited any claim it had to the dues collected by the District. 
The Association further argues that the ALJ erred by not holding a hearing when the 
District did not appear for the scheduled hearing and in dismissing the District's 
pleading. Finally, the Association argues that no interest should be awarded on the 
monies to be paid by the District to Local 1671 as ordered by the ALJ. Local 1671 
supports the ALJ's decision. The District has not responded. 
FACTS 
The last collective bargaining agreement between the District and Local 1671 
expired on June 30, 2000. Effective July 1, 2000, AFSCME required Local 1671, and all 
locals, to join a council and pay dues to the council as well as to AFSCME. Local 1671 
was advised that it was now part of Council 66. On October 12, 2000, some members 
of Local 1671 disaffiliated from AFSCME and became an unaffiliated union, calling itself 
^ Board - U-22390 -3 
Long Beach Public School Employees Group C Association or, as identified herein, the 
Association. Local 1671 continued to exist as a separate entity, still affiliated with 
AFSCME. 
The Association thereafter requested recognition as the exclusive bargaining 
agentfrom the District. When the District refused, the Association filed a represent 
petition with the Public Employment Relations Board (PERB), seeking Local 1671's 
decertification and the certification of the Association as the exclusive bargaining agent. 
An election was held under the auspices of PERB on February 5, 2001. As a result of 
the election, in which the Association prevailed, the Association was certified on March 
5, 2001.1 
On December 7, 2000, the Association, by letter to the District, claimed that it 
) 
was the successor in interest to Local 1671 and that it was, therefore, entitled to any 
dues collected by the District from unit employees. From December 2000 to March 5, 
2001, the District held the dues collected on behalf of Local 1671 in escrow. The District 
has not yet released the monies from the escrow account, arguing that it is merely a 
stakeholder and awaits PERB's direction as to which employee organization is entitled 
to the dues held in escrow. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
The District did not appear at the hearing in this matter scheduled for 
December 3, 2001, despite having received the Notice of Hearing from the ALJ, which 
specifically provided that "failure to appear at the hearing may constitute ground for 
'Long Beach City School District, 34 PERB H3000.08 (2001) 
Board - U-22390 -4 
dismissal of the absent party's pleading." The District did not appear at either of the two 
scheduled conferences in this matter, either, arguing that it was merely a stakeholder 
and would be bound by any order issued by PERB as to the disbursement of the funds 
held in escrow. 
An improper practice charge is an adversarial proceeding, in which there are 
burdens of proof and specific responsibilities placed on the parties. Our Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), §212.4(b), specifically grant to the ALJ the authority to dismiss an 
absent party's pleadings for failure to appear at a scheduled hearing. Here, the District 
was on notice of the scheduled date for the hearing and of the consequences for 
nonappearance. The District took it upon itself to characterize its role in the proceeding 
and to determine that its presence at the hearing was not required or necessary. The 
Association argues on the District's behalf that all the parties had agreed that the 
District was merely a stakeholder and need not appear at the hearing. Local 1671 
disputes the Association's assertion that there was an agreement that the District was 
not required to appear at the hearing. Certainly, the record reveals that the hearing ALJ 
was not part of any such agreement, that the District did not seek permission from the 
hearing ALJ to be absent from the hearing and that the District had not been excused 
from attendance at the hearing. 
Given the District's failure to appear at the hearing, the ALJ properly determined 
to strike the District's answer, deem the material allegations in the charge admitted and 
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find that the District waived its right to a hearing. The case could then properly be 
decided on the basis of the charge, the papers in support of the Association's motion to 
intervene and the parties' briefs.2 
DISCUSSION 
It is well-settled that it is only upon decertification that the recognized or certified 
bargaining agent loses its status as the representative of unit employees.3 Until such 
time as this Board issues a decision decertifying an incumbent employee organization, 
that organization remains obligated to fairly represent those in the bargaining unit and, in 
turn, is entitled to their dues. The District's argument that there was a competing 
organization does not relieve it of its duty to deal with the certified bargaining agent. 
When Local 1671's source of funding was unilaterally stopped by the District, it 
negatively affected Local 1671's ability to ensure unit employees' representation rights, 
as set forth in §§203 and 208 of the Act. Such interference constitutes a violation of 
§209-a.1(a)oftheAct.4 
2While denying any improper motivation, the District admitted that it had withheld 
collected dues from Local 1671 and, in its brief, argued that no interest should be 
assessed against the District because of its lack of improper motivation. 
3CityofNewburgh, 20 PERB 1J3017 (1987); County of Clinton and Sheriff of 
County of Clinton, 19 PERB ^3048 (1986); County of Erie, 17 PERB 1J3073 (1984); 
State of New York, 5 PERB 1J3060 (1972), confd, PBA ofNYS Police, Inc. v. PERB, 6 
PERB H7001 ( Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1973). 
4See Mineola Union Free Sch. Dist, 20 PERB fl4622 (1987); Norwich City Sch. 
Dist, 14 PERB H4654 (1981). 
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Further, as the expired collective bargaining agreement between the District and 
Local 1671 provides for the deduction and transmittal of membership dues by the District 
to Local 1671, the District's failure to transmit dues to Local 1671 until the date of the 
decision decertifying Local 1671, violated §209-a.1(e) of the Act. 
TheL Association argues that this is a matter involving a union's affiliation vote and 
is, therefore, outside of PERB's jurisdiction. PERB does not exercise jurisdiction over 
matters involving solely a change in a union's affiliation. 
This is so because decisions by employee organizations to affiliate 
or disaffiliate with or from parent organizations are matters over 
which PERB is without jurisdiction to preside, and in which it will not 
otherwise involve itself, except upon proceedings otherwise proper 
under the Act relating to the representation status of the employee 
organization with respect to a bargaining unit.5 
This case, however, is not one concerning only a disaffiliation issue. The unit members' 
decision to disaffiliate from AFSCME is not before us. The case as pled by Local 1671, 
and as decided by the ALJ, deals only with the propriety of a public employer withholding 
membership dues deductions from a certified employee organization. That issue falls 
squarely within our jurisdiction and we here hold that until there has been a decision 
issued by this Board decertifying an incumbent employee organization, the public 
employer is required by the Act to remit to that organization any and all membership 
dues and agency shop fees deducted from unit employees' paychecks. 
5CitySch. Dist of the City of Schenectady, 23 PERB 1T3028, at 3057 (1990). 
See, State of New York (Unified Court System), 12 PERB 1J3019 (1979). See also 
Board of Education of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 17 PERB 1J4011 
(1984); Norwich Central Sch. Dist, 14 PERB 1J4654 (1981); 
Board - U-22390 -7 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
decision of the ALJ. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. The District forthwith transmit to Local 1671 all dues collected from 
members but not remitted to AFSCME prior to March 5, 2001, with interest 
at the maximum legal rate,6 
2. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all locations normally 
used to post written communications to unit employees. 
DATED: June 12, 2002 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
hn T. Mitchell, Member 
6While the District argued to the ALJ that it should not be ordered to pay interest 
even if a violation were found because of the lack of improper motivation on its part, we 
reject its argument. "A make-whole remedy should provide for interest unless there are 
particular circumstances to warrant deviation from this principle. There are no such 
circumstances here." See Dunkirk City Sen. Dist, 17 PERB P064, at 3099 (1984). 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
) PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES'EAIR EMPLOYMENT ACX 
we hereby notify all employees of the Board of Education of the City School District of the City of Long Beach 
(District) in the unit represented by American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local 1671 
(Local 1671) that the District will forthwith: 
1. Transmit to Local 1671 all dues collected from members but not remitted to AFSCME prior 
to March 5, 2001, with interest at the maximum legal rate. 
Dated By . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OF THE CITY OF LONG BEACH 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other 
me'trjal. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE SUPREME COURT 
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, ILA, LOCAL 2013, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-23131 




NEW YORK STATE COURT OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Intervenor. 
PAT BONANNO, ESQ, for Charging Party 
LAUREN P. DE SOLE, ESQ. (RICHARD MC DOWELL of counsel), for 
Respondent 
WHITEMAN OSTERMAN & HANNA (NORMA MEACHAM of counsel), for 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
The New York State Supreme Court Officers Association, ILA, Local 2013, AFL-
CIO (SCOA) has filed exceptions to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
granting an oral motion made by the New York State Court Officers Association (COA) 
to intervene in this matter. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
SCOA's exceptions are an interlocutory appeal on legal grounds of the ALJ's 
interim decision. 
FACTS 
On February:_12, 2002, SCOAJiled an improper_p__a.cti.c_eLchargeL_alleging_th.at_th.e__ 
New York State Unified Court System (UCS) violated §§209-a. 1(b) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). SCOA also sought injunctive relief which was 
denied and, thereafter, SCOA commenced an Article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court, 
Albany County, which is still pending. 
The improper practice charge, while not naming COA as a respondent, alleges 
that UCS violated the Act when it assigned certain security work performed by SCOA to 
COA without negotiating. The answer filed by UCS also put SCOA on notice of COA's 
involvement and, subsequently, on March 20, 2002, counsel for COA notified all parties 
that COA represented the interests of COA unit employees and sought to attend the 
pre-hearing conference scheduled for April 1, 2002. 
At the pre-hearing conference, COA orally moved to intervene in the instant 
proceedings. SCOA objected on the grounds that COA had not submitted its motion in 
writing as required by §212.1 of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). The ALJ granted 
the motion. By letter dated April 24, 2002, the ALJ confirmed his decision in writing and 
gave his reasons therefor. The ALJ found that COA was an interested party and would 
be affected by the outcome of the improper practice proceeding. Because SCOA 
refused to consent to an adjournment to give COA an opportunity to submit a motion in 
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writing, the ALJ concluded that SCOA had waived any objection it might have to COA's 
oral motion. 
DISCUSSION 
The ALJ's exercise of discretion to grant COA's oral motion to intervene under 
the_facts_and circumstances of this matter was incorrect 
As a general rule, this Board will not review the interlocutory 
determinations of the Director or an Administrative Law Judge until 
such time as all proceedings below have been concluded, and 
review may be had of the entire matter. It is only when 
extraordinary circumstances are present and/or in which severe 
prejudice would otherwise result if interlocutory review were denied 
that we will entertain a request for such review.1 
Our Rules refer to six specific motions.2 A motion for intervention is one of those 
which we require to be in writing on notice to the other party. 
The record does not reflect any circumstances that would have precluded COA 
from submitting its motion in writing. On the contrary, on March 20, 2002, COA called the 
ALJ to inform him of its interest, its intention to intervene and to attend the pre-hearing 
conference scheduled for April 1, 2002. During the intervening eleven days, COA had 
ample opportunity to file a written notice to intervene, in accordance with the specific 
requirements of our Rules.3 While COA orally made a motion to intervene at the 
conference, and that motion and the decision to grant it were later confirmed in writing 
^ County of Nassau, 22 PERB U3027, at 3066 (1989). 
O C O L I U I I C\J^.O\U), IV IUUUI I IU I (JOI UL-Uldi ISCHIUM I U l II i c i ^ i i a i y e , §£.V*t.O\U}, IVIWLlOll 
for particularization of the answer; §211.6, Motion to withdraw or modify a subpoena; 
§212.1, Intervention; §212.4(1), Motion to dismiss on basis of timeliness; §212.4(g), 
Motion to recuse ALJ. 
3RuIes, §212.1. 
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by the ALJ, the record is clear that SCOA has maintained its objection to this 
procedural defect. 
In this case, the ALJ may have assumed that SCOA's objection on the merits to 
COA's motion to intervene might not have had merit, but we find that that is not a good 
and sufficient reason to depart from the specific requirements of the Rules that a 
motion to intervene be made in writing. Even though the ALJ gave SCOA an 
opportunity to respond to COA's oral motion and he confirmed the motion, the objection 
to it and his reasons for granting the motion in writing, COA's motion does not conform 
to the requirements of the Rules. We, therefore, grant SCOA's interlocutory appeal and 
find that COA's motion to intervene must be denied. 
Based on the foregoing, we grant SCOA's exception and reverse the decision of 
the ALJ to grant COA's oral motion for intervention, without prejudice to renew said 
motion in accordance with §212.1 of the Rules. SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 12,2002 
New York, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ / 7 
7 /Marc A. Xbbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW COVENANT CHARTER SCHOOL 
EDUCATION ASSOCIATION FACULTY, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5179 
NEW COVENANT CHARTER SCHOOL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New Covenant Charter School Education 
Association Faculty has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described beiow, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5179 - 2 
Included: All full-time, regular teachers, social workers, and library media 
specialists. 
Excluded: Tutors, student support managers, school technology managers, 
user support technicians, administrators, management/confidential 
employees, and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the New Covenant Charter School Education Association 
Faculty. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 12,2002 
New York, New York 
Mj^hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/ 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
jJohn T. Mitchell, Member 
^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
Petitioner, 
CASE NO. C-5199 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 264 has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 264, 
-and-
TOWN OF SHERIDAN, 
Certification - C-5199 2 -
Included: All full-time and regular part-time Highway Department Employees. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiatejc_o_ll.e_ctiv.eJy_witb theTeamstersLocal 264. The„dutyjQ_ae^oiiate_cpJIectively_.__. 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the 
making of a concession. 
DATED: June 12, 2002 
New York, New York 
^[A^U^J^^^^ 
hael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
